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The detrinental impacts of acid rain have become been widely pubHcized, and
effective, and equitable, methOds to mitigate the acid rain problem remain to be
found This paper focuses on cOnflicts in、たolved i  anocation of the total emission
ioads tO be reduced tO respective pollution sources of acid rain,and proposes a game
―theoretic approach tO the resOlutiOn of the conflict,With an example abstracted from
the real一world proble■l taking place in the North America and Canada,a systematic
analysis is performed and policy iコnplicatiOns of the results examined tO assess the
appHcability of the propOsed model,
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■. 工ntroductiOn
ln  Europe, North America and even Japan, the detrimenta■ impacts  of
acid  rain have recently been wide■y pub■icized an  much research work  has
been conducted to deve■op eff ctiVe strategies for acid rain abatement.  As
a  means of quantifying the impactS Of alternative  management  strategieS,
■arge―sca■e  ■inear programm■ng―b sed screening models have  been  emp■oyed
[■1,[21,[3].
Neverthe■ess,  effective, and  equitab■e, means o control  acid  rain
emissions  at  po■■utiOn sources remain to be studied. A typical  c■as   of
prob■em  which  invo■Ves  equ■tabe  means  of  abatement  may  be   termed
reso■ution of acid rain conf■icts whiCh in turn involves a highly pO■itica■
decision―making  process,  MCBean and Okada [4]and Hipe■ and  et  a■. [5]
c■a■med  that thiS decision―making process may be likened to  enactment  of
mu■ti―player igame' with each p■ayer possessing a set of viab■e optiOns nd
preferences.  Characteristica■■y,  the viab■e options  avai■ab■e   tO  each
p■ayer  are  qua■itative■y different and their preferences to  be  assessed
on■y in terms of Ordero Metagame ana■yses Were app■ied d their  potentia■
of  scientifica■■y  ex mining this type of conf■ict  management  strategies
demonstrated.
This paper dea■s with a different type of conflict resolution which iS
becoming  a  centra■iSSue of po■iCy―makers in acid  rain  management.  The
problem  ■s how to assign the target depos■tes to be reduced in  respective
receptors  to  maJor emission sources whiCh are common■y  ■ocated qu te  a
distance  from the receptors.  A conf■ict a ises among receptorsi  each  Of
them  seeks to reduce the target burden of em■ss■ons r duction as muCh  as
poss■b e  whi■e  the  tOta■ amounts of burdens ■mpoSed on them  are  to  be
fixed. The more one reduces the target ■eve■, the■ ss the others,  Another
aspect of the COnf■ict is hOW to balance the trade―off rela ionship between
efficient  (cOSt―effective)and fair means of assigning target  burdens  Of
emissions  reduction  to each emission source. The  above―stated  screening
mode■s  are  capab■e of se■ecting effectiVe technica■ means  of  ac■d r ■n
abatement at emission sources but are incapable of exp■icitly analyzing the
reso■ution of the cOnflict at Stake.
This  lxaper  presents  a game―th oretic approach  to  this  ac■d  ra■n
abatement conf■ict, that is, effective and fair a■location of emissiOnS  tO
be  reduced  to  emission  sources.  We  note  first  that  this  type   of
environmenta■   management  conf■iCt  is  Categorized  as   a■location Of
environmenta■  ■oads Of reduction to po■lution sources. Ki■gour et  a■.[■0]
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tOr  J.  We term this assignment method as tA' mode of  assignment  or  the
proportiona■ assignment method. This mode is mathematica■■y defined s
p lj=a iJ//E alj  (a ij≧0) (2)
b)  'EA'  mode:  The ratio is determined in proportion  to  the  respective
transfer coefficients aiJweighted by et representing the amounts of emissions
at  source  i. We refer to this as 'EA' mode or the  weighted  proportional
assignment method, This mode is formu■ated as
p ij=ei aij/′Eelalj (3)
c) Max―Min ttodet For each receptor 」, either of those ratios derived  from
both tA' and 'EA' modes ■s set as ■ther of the upper or ■ower bound on the
range of va■ues, and  the ratio is equalized over sources i (=■,..,n)to  a
maximum  extent so that there may not be those sOurces to which  improper■y
large  amounts of loads reduction are a■locatedo We assune here  that  each
source  (p■ayer) i  may act independent■y to achieve  the  most  equitab■e
target ratio for itself, given an arbitrary receptor 」, or that it may form
a  group  (partia■)or grand (entire)COalition to work together,  and   to
achieve  the  most  equ■tab■e  target ratio for the  group  per  se,  given
receptor J.  ThiS mode ■s define  as a linear programm■g  problem for each
receptor 」 (=■,..,n), such that
sub. toIj△dj≧ε
ρ fj△dJ≧ISIε
for aH(1.j)
for any S(ti}`≧St  N)
where S stands for an arbitrary (group)coa■ition inc■uding b th  the grand
coa■ition  which  is  formed by all emission sources as  players,  and  the
independent sources going alone.  ISidenOtes the number of members who  form
the coalition S.
Phase  2, Civen the constraints as determined in Phase l, emission  sources
are assumed to pursue the min■m■zation of the cOst burdens to be ■mposed on
themselves.  In  reso■vi g  this conflict, al■  emissiOn  sOurces  who  are
regarded as the p■ayers of the game are assumed to cooperate w■th a v■ew to
forming  a  grand  coalition  N; thus they may  achieve  overa■■  the  most
efficient (COst―effec ive)allocation of the actual amounts of lOads to  be
reduced at respective sources.  This is based on the supposition that  with
an  increase in size, the total benefits (pay―offs)Of forming a  coa■ition
?
?
?
?
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and  Okada  et  a■.[■1],[■21 showed
pol■ution  sources  ■ocated a■ong a
formu■ated  as  a  cooperative game
current paper extends this approach
long―range   transport
of emitted  po■■utants
to receptors.
2,  ModelFormu■ation
2.■ Assumed Hierarchi―
ca■ Process of Load
Allocation
The  process  of al―
locating the target
deposition ■oads to
be  reduced  to re―
that a■■ocation of  COD  ■oads  to  the
semェーc■osed water system  may  wel■  be
theory model.  In  the  fol■owing  the
by incorporating the mechanism of  the
Fig I  MOdel diagram
spective  em■ss■on  SOurces are assumed
to take a hierarchical dec■s■on m king
process  as il■u trated in Fig.  2.  The
assumed source―receptor relattionship  is
modeled as in Fig。 1.
Phase l: We assume a decision―aking
body on federa■ ■ v ■. This body sets up
the maximum a■■owable deposites in re一
ceptor j, d jmax(」‐■,...m).In  Other words,
they  specify the  minimum  amounts  of
emissions to be reduced,Δd」(>0)
△dJ=dj―d tmax (1)
Given△djfor J=■,.・ ,m, we propose three
distinct modes of ass■ngn■ng the target
■oads  to respective em■ss■on sources, i=
1,..,n  as  fo■■ows,  The target ratio of
assignment of△d to source l,pitis deter―
m■ned by one of  the fo■■owing:
a)  'A'  mode: The ratio is deternined in
proportion to the respective transfer co―
effic■ents O representing the ratio of the
amounts of the  ■oads m■tted at source ■
to those transported from there to recep―  i fr
①__O
す/J′ea
en
,①
′θ′′′サデθ′
el      e2
∫θv′θθ∫ てた
ei
。一 ① …
r)
a ij
とr′′sFθ′
θθθFrrfrθ′サ
↓＼くミ:
△ △
di  d2
?
?
′θじθPιθr∫ てkg/ねつ/year)
Jmax dePosites in receptor y
p j:::rtiti:a::ir::ザSignment
″!:actual emounts of enissionl  reduced at source  
ど
yt:ECtual costs fo「emi slon
reductic  at source  ど
Calculate
ξl:costs to be allocated
o source  ど
Load allocation process
|
Given
optima■
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increase in terms of reduced costs. To borrow a term from game theory, this
assumes the '■aw of superadditiv■ty' to hold for increased coa■ition s■zes
Therefore  th。 つrob■em is formulated as
min    EfI(Xi)
sub. tO  二a tJXi≧△dl,(j=1,2,…・・m),0≦xi≦et
the  optima■ solutions X I・to this optimization prob■em, we
total costs, Y(N)as
Y(N)=〒fi(XT)
Phase  3:  Civen the optimal―cost information, Y(N)as  obtained  from  the
analysis in phase 2, We now turn to allocation of the total costs  This per
se  is an interesting theme of cooperative game theory  Much research  work
has  been  documented  in  the literature  (eg.  [13],[■4]).  The  proposed
approaches  are  basica■■y  cla s■fied into twoi one  be■ng  based  on  the
concept  of  core as a fa■r al■ocation scheme, and another based  on  other
concepts other than the core, A famous and simple scheme of fair allocation
to fa■l under the second category is Shapley Value. The idea is to a■locate
the  tota■  costs  fOr the grand coalltion so that the  margina■  costs  of
participation  in  the respective coalition as the last  member  shou■d  be
averaged  over a■l poss■ble combinations of coalitions for  the  particu■ar
p■ayer (eg.[■31,[14])。
The  core  that under■ies the a■location scheme of the first  category  is
mathematical■y defined as
(i=l,2,・-ln)
(7)
where Y (S)for COa■ition S is obtained for the optimal so■utions xi to  the
fo■owing optimization prob■eml
(5)
g t  the
(6)
(8)
(■0)
are  ca■led
(■■)
l  illlζ!::I
?
?
?
E fi(xl)
退ai」Xi≧二ρ Fj△d,(j=1,2,一',■),o≦xI≦ei
Likewise,  Y((1}) fOr independent p■ayer i is obtained  for  the  optimaユ
so■utions O to the optimization つroble :
{s汎1乳心?i笹迄ρ呵△的It is noted that tne assumed law of
v(N)≧v(S)+v(N―s)
s粗蒐
=ょ
と
`!!乎
i:デrざ竜毛ょted as (9)
for  any coalition S inc■udi g ( }, where v(N), V(S)and v((i})
the character■stic functions of this cooperative game.
They are defined as
v(N)=―Y(N)V(S)=一Y(S),v(N―s)=一Y(N―S)
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PollutiOn sOurces :
ManitOba state
?
―
?
?
Table l: Assumed alnounts of enission froin sourceぢ
Place
l N Manitoba8
S.?ltanitoba
N W Ontttio
N E Ontario7
109んθ/ycar)
Ontario state
Taue 2:Assumed amounts of deposites in receptor J
Table 3, M弱(imu■l allowable amounts of deposites
in receptor J
Fig。3  Study area
The core as defined above may not a■ways x―
■st. If it ex■sts, there ■s no guarantee that
it has a unique feas■b■e so■ution, Core―bas d
a■■ocation  methods such as  Nuc■eo■ s,  Weak
Least Core,  Proportiona■ Leas   Core may  be
app■ied to reduce it to a unique one (e.g.
[■3],[■43).
3. Case Study: MOde■ ApplicatiOns
3.■ Study Area
The study area which represents a rea■―wor■d acid rain conf■cit in  North
Amer■ca and Canada ■s se■cted as i■■ustrated in Fig, 3. The data were co■―
■ected basica■■y from Cibian [6], Streets [7], Webber [8]and Cranda■■ [9].
Sulfate)
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Table 4 Assunled values lor transler coencientsTable 5 Cases of anlysis
1
じぉeA Receptor
Source 1 3
1 025020029
2 0,77077
3 167167167167
4 2 tJIJ091143104
unit:んσ・sttr Faを9/んα/10νたo/vec′・
2
CぉeB Iteceptor
Source ユ 3
1 0450250200.29
0770770.10 10
1671.671 67167
299091143104
Ctte C Receptor
Source 1 2
1 045025020029
0770770000.00
200200Z υυ Z,OU
299091143104
Case E 孔eceptor
Source 1 2 4
l 0.45025 029
2 0.77077000000
3 167167167167
4 29909ユ 1.43104
工t  is noted, however, that the application mode■ thus S ec fied  may  not
preclse■y ref■ect the real wor■d prob■em. 工t is rather a hypothetical mode■
which abstracts the essence of the actua■ conf■i t.
The cost function with respect to Xi, the amounts of emissions reduced  is
identified as
Ctte Remarks
(DifFerences ttom Standard)
Case AStanderd Case
CぉeBRel)lace 2erO entries with 0 1 in αjη
Case CIncrette each of αゥfor source t=3
bv 20紗9T cc,2を
Case DDecreぃc of each αjυ for sourceぢ=3
bv 20,9Tc9,1と
Case EUPgrade target reduction ratio for each
recel)tor fron1 50 to 7p pじTc9兌せ
Table&Tal・get ratios Of load assignment(2j)fOr ctte A
Case D Receptor
もource 1 2 3 4
1 0450.25020029
2 0770,77
3 1341.34134134
2990911.43104
EA mode Receptor
もource l 3
ユ 006005004006
2 013017000000
3 0470.640,71075
4 0.34014025019
MAX―MIN mode Receptor
Source 1 3
008005
2 0.130.17000
3 0395 053059
4 03950250.43035
fi(xl)=0590255(exp(00927209・l)-1)
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which is assumed to be
■dentica■ for a■■ em■s―
s■on sources, Because
of its convex■ty,
piece―w■se ■inear pro―
gramming approach is
used in so■ving the
optim■zation prob■ems.
Other parameters are
set as ■i ted in
Tab■es ■ to 4.
3.2 Study Cases
The  study cases  of
ana■ysis are set up as
■isted  in  Tab■e  5,
where Case A corres―
ponds to the standard
case  and other cases
to its variants,
3.3 Mode■ Ca■culations
■)Ana■ysis of  Stand―
ard Case (CaSe A)
App■ication of the
Phase ■ mode■ gives
the target ratios of
■oad assignment ca■―
cu■ated as ■i ted in
Tab■e 6. Ana■ysis of
this table indicates:
(■)App■ication of the
EA mode resu■ts in the
va■ues of the target
Table 7: Caluculated e■lissions reduced and needed for a set of coalition
types(Case A〉
(ellaiSSiOns:109んcostsi JOどどα″
CoalitionA niode EA modeMAX MIN mode
Grand γ(Ar 1/fⅣ 1/(Ⅳ)
N 1
2
3
4
0
0,0000
9,0000
16154
υも6b30
00000
90000
16154
00000
00000
90000
16154
08653
Group y(∂) r(∂ L/fJ
00000
00000
74102
58370.0000
0.0000
84970
071030.0000
00000
74102
5837
00000
36453
6,7067
7510U.υυU
23961
45000
0.4502υ υUυυ
2,8498
6.1106
1
3
4
U∪υUU
75000
28606
077修8 υ.υυυυ
75000
28606
0772800000
75000
28606
07728
U.υUUU
83713
15000
07336U U00U
856S9
15000
080680
85689
15000
0806も
上 3206」
51731
0.5709
36731
04463ё ZUりυ
3.6731
04468
1
3
00000
60329
4427υ UUUυ
7.5180
059500000
60329
04427
1
4
U UUυυ
67067
0,511rU tjUUU
3.7260
0.2456U UυU
61106
0,4506
2
3
00000
67186
5129U υUυU
80030
06521U.09110
6,9162
5331
Z
4 59835
0.6271l
43517
03822,8352
52164
U54rO
j
4
7 41υZ
15000
75000
19664
0,7125r bυυ
19664
0,7125
Singie γ(1お r({ゥ}) γr,
l 5344803809330000,2126 02126
2 47143U.3Z4r3 642tJUツもυl 0.2391
3 510480.359569611053775476]03926
4 521640369528317017795Z16403695
Ⅳ Costs neededi for Rrand coahtion,7(∬) ,lor gr
Emissions reduced,1/(δ)i COStS needed,fOr srouP COdition
E?ssions reduced,y(モサ})i COStS needed,fOr sin81e coalition
ratios  eva■uated basical■y ha■fway between those obta■ned from the A  mode
and  those from the Max―Min  mode assignment. This is a typica■ analytica■
property bui■t in the assumed modes of assignment.
(2)RigOrous■y, this is not true of the va■ues for Source 3. The ca■cu■ated
ratio is highest for the EA mode's app■ication. The  reason
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is  that the amounts of emis―  Table Si Calucldated costs to be allocated(by ShalDley Value)
sion at this source are  esti―
mated to be highest  and  that
the proportiona■ assignment as
weighted by this index  pushes
up the target  ratio  for this
source to the highest value.
By applying the phase 2 model
to  Case A,  we   obta■n   the
results as ■isted in Table  7.
Proceeding  to  the  Phase   3
ana■ysls  by  use  of  shap■ey
Va■ue and Nu■eo■us resu■ts  tt n
the cost a■■oc tions as  shown
in Tab■es 8 and 9, respecti―
ve■y,   Scrutiny of these re―
su■ts shows that:
(1)The out■ined patterns Of
cost  a■■ocations are  ■denti―
cal,  In  the  Shap■ey   Va■ue
case,   for  ■nstance,   those
sources  which have ■arge v ■―
ues for the■r re■ated transfer
109 Jοιどα?ヽ
case A mode EA lllodeMAX一MIN mode
Ctase A3ourceCostsbourceCostsさourceCosts
1
3
4
01795
01953
02004
02901
1
2
3
4
01114
01638
04193
01408
1
01635
02891
03005
CぉeB SourceCostsSourceCostsSourceCosts
2
3
4
υ lrlo
02211
01933
012795
υ,lUOと
02005
04314
01272
1
2
01Uイ5
02009
02709
02860
CぉeC SourceCostsSollrceCostsSourceCosts
0
01719
0,1296
02222
1 00も41
01327
03454
01190
υUもёも
01322
02209
0.2422
CぉeD もourceCostsbourceCostsもourceCosts
1
2
3
4
U`ZツUU
02433
0.2880
0.3406
1
2
3
4
0
02054
05839
01686
1 1
02083
03853
03622
Case」bourceCostsbourceCostsもourceCosts
0.3054
03246
03188
0.1449
01740
02553
0,7550
02095
1
2
3
4
0,1780
02571
0.4810
04777
coefficients  and emission amounts tend to share the highest costs for  any
mode  assignment,  Surce 3 which em■ts the ■argest  amounts  of  po■■utants
among  a■■  sources, is a typica■ examp■e of this, which is  al■o ated  the
highest  costs  when the EA mode ■s applied, and the  second  highest  when
either  of  the A mode or Max一Min mode is app■ed. Likewise,  Source  4  is
found  to  contr■bute  a great deal to the  ■ong―range  transport  of  pO■―
■utants  to the receptOr areas since it has re■ative■y arge va■ues for  ts
related   transfer  coefficients.  Consequently  it   shares  the   highest
allocated  costs  by  the  A mode and  Max―Min  mo  assignments.  On  the
contrary,  other  sources such as Sources i and 2 are found to  share  ■ess
costs.
(il) The Max―Min mode tends to he■p equa■ize the way the tota■  costs  are
shared by the sources.
(ili)The same tendencies may be observed for the resu■ts when Nuc■eou■s, a
typical core―based fair a■■ocation method, is employed (see Tab■e 9).
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2)Comparative and Sensitivi―
ty Analyses of Cases B to E
Ca■cu■ations are conducted to
operationa■ly na■yze  several
variants   of  Case  A.   From
Tab■es   8  and  9,   We   may
conc■ude that:
(■) CaSe B is different  from
Case A mere■y in that a■■ the
zero  entries are  changed  to
O.l  for Source 2.  Obv■ous■y,
the  resu■t is  the  increased
costs  ■mpOsed  on  Source  2,
which   we■■   ref■cts    the
■ncreased obligations of em■s―
sions   reduction   for   this
source  when group  coa■itions
or  independent cases are  ex―
amined   in  Phase   2,   thus
exp■icitly    asSessing    its
bargainabi■ity in the cost a■―
■ocation game to fo■■ow.
In  contrast,  prec■se■y  the
same ca■u■ation resu■t is Ob―
ta■ned for the grand coa■ltion
in  the  Phase 2 ana■ysis, The above fact is always the same  for  whateVer
mode of target ratio assignment is app■ied Or whiChever method of COSt  a■―
location ■s employed. Otherwise, the same tendencies are observed as  thOSe
for the standard case.
(2) Case  C iS different from Case A in that those  transfer  coefficients
related to Source 3  are assumed to take increased va■es by 20  perOent,
with  an  imp■ication  that the source that emits the  ■argest  amounts  of
po■lutants  is  now assumed tO affect the receptors even  more  so.  This
resu■ts ln an increased effic■ency and effectiveness of em■ss■o S COntro■
at  this source, which in turn ■eads to the tota■costs reduced by some  20
percent  for  the grand coalition in the Phase 2 ana■ysis. Simi■ar■y,  the
tota■  costs  are found to be reduced for any  other  coa■itions  inc■uding
going  independent■y. In consequence, a■■ sources enjoy decreased costs  to
share. Espec■a■■y, Source 3 shares costs reduced by 35 to 50 percent, slnce
■ts  barga■nabi ty is ■mproved as a resu■t of increased  effic■ncy  in
Table 9i Caluculated costs to be mlocated(by NHcleolus)
( 109 ,οιιa,ヽ
Ctte A ll■ode EA IOde MAX一MIN nlode
Case ASourceCostsSourceCostsSourceCosts
1
2
3
4
U14老Z
01410
02566
03255
l
4
00692
02016
04258
01657
1
2
4
00953
0.1792
02723
03185
Case BSourceCostsSourceCostsSourceCosts
1
2
3
01190
02709
01565
0.3189
1 0
02143
04246
01614
1 0
02006
02607
03135
CぉeC SourceCostsSourceCosts5ollrceCosts
l
2 01153
0.1853
02611
1
3
4
0
01848
03024
0.1382
1
2
3
4
00も4も
01599
01847
02518
CぉeD b urceCos sbourceCostsもourceCosts
上
2
3
4
01654
01928
03466
03872
1
2
3
4
U υt」υ■
02268
05794
01955
01927
04066
03860
Case ESourceCostsSourceCostsSourceCosts
U Z4υ5
02456
0.3904
05083
l
2 0.3121
0,7255
02434
1
4
01572
02660
0.4686
0,5918
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emissions   contro■,  thus  Justifying  amounts  of   emissions   reduction
concentrated exc■usiv ■y On this source.  This fact holds for whatever mode
of  target  ratio  assignment  is applied  or  whichever  method  of   cost
a■■ocation is used. Otherwise, the same tendencies may be obtained as those
for Case A.
(3) Case  D  is a variant of case A and in a way symmetrica■  to  case C.
Those transfer coeffic■ents re■ated to source 3 are FeduCed by 20  percent,
As a resu■t, precise■y the reverse facts are c■aimed as ompared to Case C.
Less efficiency is achieved at Source 3, with a resu■t in a ■ess  intensive
treatment  of emissions at this source and  more distributed treatments  at
other sources than in Case A, which in turn leads to an increased share  of
costs  ■mpOsed  on  the source. This is true ■rrespective of  the  mode  of
target ratio assignment se■ected or the method of cost a■l cation  appied.
In  other  respects, the tendehcies are found to be basica■ly the  same  as
obtained from Case A,
(4) Case  E  assumed to adopt the  federa■―■evel po■icy  of  reducing  the
current  deposites in receptors by 70 percent, other than 50 percent  which
■s assumed for Case A. The resu■t is t at the total costs as we■■ as hose
al■ocated  to each source increase by 50 to ■00 percent. This is the  case
for  whatever  mode  of target ratio assignment is  se■cted  r  which ver
method of cost al■oca ion is app■ed. Otherw■s , we get the tendenc■es that
para■le■ those derived for Case A.
5. Conclusion
As has we■■ b en i■■ustrated in the above analyses, the proposed model has
been  proved to derive sc■entif cal■y some reasonable a■■ocations  of  both
the emission ■oads for reduction  and resu■tant costs to their sources. The
decision―making mechanism assumed in this paper was a three―phased rocess,
and  thus the conflcit has been formu■ated as a hierarchica■ g me.  With  a
hypothetica■  example  of ana■ysis abstracted from  a  real―wor■d  conflict
taking  p■ace  in North America and Canada, systematic ana■yses  have  b en
conducted  and the imp■ications of the resu■ts discussed in deta■■. We  m y
conc■ude from this that the proposed mode■ wi■■ bec m  a us fu■  cientific
too■  in  deve■oping efffective, and equitab■e, alternatives of  acid  rain
abatement.
However,  there  remains  much to be done in this ■ine of  research.  For
instance,  the  p■ausibility  of  the ma」or  aSSumtions  that  under■y  the
proposed mode■ sh u■ be carefu■ly reexanined  aga■st actua■ities. This ls
even more ■mportant if the mode■ is to b  app■ied to a real―wor■d conf■ict,
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with  a  view  to  developing  a  viab■  means of acid  rain  abatement,
Uncertainties  involved in estimating va■ues of parameters shou■d  be  morc
exp■icitly   accounted  for,   From  a  veiwpoint  of  game   theory,   the
hierarchica■  structure  of  the  confliCt  may  need  a  more  theoretical
development,
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